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 Executive Summary 
 
Property rights to provide wireless services are severely truncated, with licenses typically 
defining services, technologies, and business models.  Economists have long advocated 
liberalization, allowing wireless operators to optimize inputs and outputs subject only to airwave 
interference limits.  This extension of rights promotes efficiency, but also prompts equity 
questions regarding “windfalls.”  Additional rights allow greater productivity which, by itself, 
increases licensee profits.  Yet reforms that grant flexibility to multiple licensees simultaneously 
reduce entry barriers.  The net windfall may be positive or negative.    This paper tests the 
direction of license value changes for regimes that decisively shift toward property rights in radio 
spectrum by analyzing prices paid in cell-phone license auctions since the mid-1990s.  This 
unique data set encompasses over 1,400 licenses assigned by competitive bidding in 42 auctions 
held in 27 countries.   Licenses awarded by regimes with expansive spectrum property rights 
generate winning bids 38% less than other licenses, adjusting for supply and demand factors.  
This evidence of negative licensee windfalls suggests that liberalization strongly enhances 
wireless competition, lowering expected retail prices, and reducing entry barriers in 
communications markets. 
   1
Property Rights and Wireless License Values 
Thomas W. Hazlett 
 
1. Efficiency And The Market Value Of Rights 
 
  Since Ronald Coase’s seminal analysis of property rights to radio spectrum (1959), 
economists have advanced the notion that liberalizing the rights held by wireless users would 
expand social welfare.
1  This policy position has been adopted – categorically in a handful of 
cases, incremental in many more – in reforms instituted throughout the world. Market allocation 
of radio spectrum, which requires de facto or de jure private property rights to radio waves, is 
increasingly acknowledged to be superior to administrative planning mechanisms now 
pejoratively referenced as “command and control.”
2   Indeed, a group of “37 Concerned 
Economists” recently enunciated the economic consensus by petitioning the Federal 
Communications Commission to relax all restrictions on the use of spectrum by a licensee, 
enforcing only interference contours and antitrust rules (Rosston et al., 2001).   
  Parallel to the economic argument for liberalization, policy makers in the United States, 
European Union countries, and elsewhere are considering an extension of licensee rights by 
permitting secondary markets to reassign wireless bandwidth from regulatory allocations.  This 
could give a television broadcaster, for instance, the opportunity to sell the frequency space 
allocated to its license for over-the-air TV to a mobile phone operator looking to expand capacity 
for wireless voice and data services.   
  Gains from trade are evident.  Social benefits stand to be particularly large, moreover, as 
reassignments would rationalize inefficient spectrum allocations made via central planning 
mechanisms notable for their protection of obsolete technologies at the expense of innovative 
networks.
3  Despite large gains in productivity, however, proposals for liberalization often 
generate concern over windfalls.  To permit a television station, authorized to provide broadcast 
video, to profit from providing other services (or selling rights to do so), may trigger a political 
backlash that effectively blocks reform.  Social losses ensue from the debate over equity. 
                                                 
1   Levin 1971; Owen 1975; Kwerel & Williams 1992; Huber 1997; Rosston and Steinberg 1997; Hazlett 2001; 
Rosston et al. 2001;  Faulhaber & Farber 2002; Kwerel & Williams 2002. 
2   FCC 2002.  It should be noted that while the Federal Communications Commission analytically criticizes the 
policy, it yet embraces it operationally (Hazlett 2003a).     2
  The argument poses an interesting empirical question concerning the relationship 
between license rents and property rights.  Are license prices higher, in fact, where the bundle of 
property rights conveyed in the license is more generous?  The answer appears obvious, in that 
property rights are themselves valuable and an owner endowed with additional rights benefits 
from the ability to optimize production with fewer constraints.  Yet, expanding the spectrum 
rights bundle has two effects.  First, it enables licensees to be more productive by supplying 
additional services, utilizing a broader range of technologies, and adjusting their business 
operations as dictated by profit considerations.  Alone, this flexibility has positive value.   
However, a non-specific expansion of rights creates pecuniary externalities which reduce license 
value.  That is because license rigidities that constrain competing (or potentially competitive) 
licensees effectively confer exclusivity.   
  Consider the major market cellular telephone licenses issued in the United States between 
1983 and 1986.  Licenses mandated the use of a particular analog standard, AMPS (Advanced 
Mobile Phone Service).  After cellular systems in the 305 largest US markets had been 
constructed, however, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) relaxed the AMPS 
mandate, allowing licensees to employ – at their discretion – digital technologies.  This 
liberalization can be characterized as the awarding of a property right by regulatory fiat.  Did the 
awards confer windfalls?  
  If awarded to a single operator, the relaxation of input constraints would predictably be 
associated with a wealth gain.  In reality, however, rights are interdependent.
4  This policy 
change, like most important reforms, bestowed additional rights on multiple licensees.  To the 
degree that digital technologies are efficient, AMPS licensees were no longer protected by 
license rigidities. Indeed, truncating the property rights bundle has served as a cartel enforcement 
device,
5 as eliminating a use restriction expands the prospect of competitive entry.  To determine 
the direction of the windfall associated with additional flexibility, the change in license value 
                                                                                                                                                             
3      Rosston & Hazlett 2001; Owen 1999; Hazlett 2001. 
4   The more general the spectrum reform, the more inter-dependent they are.  The relaxation of the analog 
technology mandate on cellular phones was general only to cellular telephone licensees.  This paper focuses on  
what might be called extreme forms of general spectrum deregulation.  This allows clarity in assessing what is the 
most general, and interesting, question concerning the relationship between license rents and property rights. 
5   In fact, the industry instrumental in establishing the spectrum regulatory regime in the United States, radio 
broadcasting, lobbied for “public interest” control of bandwidth.  This regime, adopted in the 1927 Radio Act with 
the strong support of incumbent commercial broadcast stations, pre-empted emerging common law rights that 
granted explicit “priority in use” ownership rights to frequencies.  See Hazlett 1990, 1997; Dill 1938.   3
associated with the right to be more productive (gain) is compared to the change associated with 
increased competition from more efficient competitors (loss). 
This paper assesses the direction of licensee windfalls associated with additional property 
rights in situations relevant to policy makers in countries contemplating general spectrum 
liberalization.  This is done by evaluating the sales prices of over 1,400 licenses authorizing 
operation of a wireless telephone network assigned in 42 separate auctions in 27 countries.       
After adjusting for cross-country differences in the demand for wireless licenses, including 
income and market structure, as well as the type of auction held, it is found that licenses issued 
by countries awarding substantially more extensive property rights are less valuable than licenses 
issued under more restrictive rules.  The difference is large – about 38 percent.  
The evidence concerning license values is important to ongoing policy discussions in at 
least three ways.   
 
o  Liberalization brings lower retail prices.  Since bids for wireless licenses are a function 
of the expected present value of profits, lower license prices reflect the expectation of 
lower retail prices.  This supports the view that consumers gain substantially from 
awarding additional property rights to licensees.   
 
o  Windfalls from general spectrum liberalization are negative.  Equity concerns have 
proven a political barrier to regulatory reform, as some argue that the gains from 
expanded opportunities “[belong] to the public and not to specific individuals or 
operators” (Stumpf and Nett 2003, p. 10).  Economists have advocated rationing flexible 
use rights, purposely withholding some rights, to extract greater revenue (Rothkopf and 
Bazelon 2003).  The data provided by international experiments in liberal rights regimes, 
however, suggest that “windfalls” are likely to be negative.  This reverses the equity 
argument. 
 
o  Incumbents generally oppose additional property rights for others and, in pursuing this 
objective, often oppose policies which would grant them additional property rights, as 
well.  Truncating the property rights available to others often confers substantial rents on 
incumbent licensees.  To gain policies that exclude competition, incumbents often   4
eschew property rights for themselves.  This is most famously demonstrated in the long-
running embrace by broadcasters of the “public interest” regulation, wherein licensees 
have traditionally claimed to be exempt from market pressures – including competitive 
bidding for licenses – on the grounds that they were merely “public trustees” and neither 
wanted, nor possessed, private property rights.    The strategic use of regulation has 
important public choice implications.   
 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes the rights conveyed when a 
wireless license is assigned by the government.  Section III more formally defines the 
relationship between property rights held by a wireless licensee and the rents associated with 
license ownership.  Section IV discusses the basic approach to spectrum allocation policy in 
countries which assign licenses via competitive bidding.  This section also describes the 
distinctly liberal approaches to spectrum use adopted in Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala and 
El Salvador.  Section V describes the unique wireless license auction dataset created to compare 
license values.  Section VI develops a theory of wireless license values and property rights. 
Section VII then offers a regression model with which to estimate the direction of windfalls. 
Estimation results are presented in Section VIII, the key finding being that wireless licenses 
embodying a much fuller array of property rights are found to be 38% less valuable, all else 
equal.  The implication, which stands up to alternative explanations, is that liberalization makes 
wireless markets much more efficient, reducing the exclusivity value embedded in wireless 
telephone licenses.  Section IX offers a conclusion. 
 
2. Defining A Wireless License 
 
In the United States and most other nations, wireless bandwidth is allocated to licenses by 
the regulatory authority.  What is conveyed to the recipient of the license is the opportunity to 
conduct the business specifically authorized, according to rules embedded in the license.  These 
determine the range of services offered, technological standards, channelization of bandwidth, 
business model, location of facilities, and geographic coverage areas, for example.  A TV station 
does not have the freedom to abandon video broadcasts in order to use “its” channel for cellular 
telephone service.  A satellite radio operator cannot use frequencies allocated for its direct-to-  5
customer radio broadcasts to mix in locally-generated terrestrial signals.  Rather than a 
“spectrum license,” wireless authorizations are most analogous to operating permits (Kwerel and 
Williams 1992, Rosston & Steinberg 1997; Hazlett 2001, Rosston et al., 2001).
6 
Licensees inherit the market structure determined by spectrum allocation rules.  The 
standard explanation focuses on a two-step process (Robinson 1985):    
 
(1)  Spectrum allocation.  The regulatory authority determines which wireless services 
will be authorized, what spectrum they will use, the technologies and business models 
allowed, and how many competing operators will be licensed.
7   
(2)  License assignment.  When excess demand obtains, licensees are selected through 
comparative hearings (beauty contests), lotteries, or auctions.
8  
  
In order to participate in the service market enabled by a spectrum allocation, a firm must 
be licensed.
9   The value of this input is determined by the value of its marginal product, which is 
equal to the expected present value of profits from the business opportunity specified in the 
license.   Auctions are designed to transfer these sums to the public fisc. 
The traditional way to think about the rights issued wireless licenses is outlined in this 
regulatory filing, which advocates that competitive bidding be employed to eliminate any 
“giveaways” associated with liberalization of license rights: 
 
                                                 
6   Over the past three decades, U.S. policy makers have gradually implemented reforms which allow some market 
reallocation of radio waves.  See Shelanski and Huber 1998; Kwerel & Williams 2002.  In such cases, government 
regulation is made permissive.  For instance, personal communications service (PCS) licenses created in the early 
1990s allowed wireless carriers the freedom to select telephone technologies, resulting in competition between 
TDMA, CDMA, GSM and iMode networks.  Permitting particular licensees flexibility on a case-by-case basis 
constitutes a qualitatively distinct policy regime from one endowing licensees with generic airwave property rights, 
in that the latter carries far broader implications for competition.  See Rosston et al. 2001; Hazlett 2001. 
7   A range of business model decisions can be embedded in license rules.  Some spectrum allocations mandate that 
services be provided on a common carrier basis (see explanation of U.S. “guard band” licenses in Rosston 2001), or 
that wholesale services be provided with retail services offered by independent suppliers.  Some rules stipulate that 
services are authorized on an unlicensed basis, where spectrum is shared by rival users.  In this instance, technical 
standards, power limits, and equipment regulation are commonly imposed to limit interference. 
8   This regulatory structure did not initially govern the distribution of property rights to the use of radio spectrum in 
the United States.  In the early days of radio broadcasting, common law rules of priority in use (also known as 
adverse possession, right of user, and squatter’s sovereignty) were used to resolve conflicting claims.  See Hazlett 
1990; Lueck 1995. 
9   This limits this discussion to services provided in licensed spectrum bands.   6
The issuance or modification of a license that grants such new, valuable and 
“flexible” rights to private parties is the equivalent of a new license… If the 
Commission reaches the decision that the “public interest, convenience and 
necessity” supports opening a band to an entirely new service – by granting 
“flexibility” within that band – then… there appears to be no statutory or policy 
reason why that redefined and far more valuable license would not be opened to 
competitive bidding (Calabrese and Feld 2002, p. 27). 
 
  This characterization of property rights deconstructs the wireless license into its 
component privileges, attaching positive incremental value to additional rights.  The effect of the 
grant of new license “flexibilities” on the value of pre-existing rights, which may be losing some 
degree of exclusivity, is implicitly eliminated by assumption.   The empirical validity of this 
approach is the issue this paper seeks to address. 
 
3. Property Rights, Wealth, And License Rents 
 
The development of property lies at the heart of economic growth.  De Soto (2000) posits 
that expanding explicit property rights is essential to the creation of capital in developing 
countries, where the relative lack of enforceable rights has prevented productive utilization of 
valuable assets.
10  This builds on research that associates the expansion of property rights with 
economic development (North and Thomas 1973; North and Weingast 1989). 
Yet, individual firms can benefit when property rights are truncated.  Regulated firms 
naturally seek to influence rules that impose restrictions on competitors (Stigler 1971).   In 
wireless markets, license restrictions block a service supplier from exploiting productive 
opportunities, and so limit profitability.  But these restrictions are embedded in other licenses, 
and simultaneously reduce competitive pressure.  In fact, license restrictions have been sought by 
                                                 
10 In a TIME MAGAZINE article De Soto illustrates this as follows: “In 1990, for example, the Compania Peruana de 
Telefonos was valued on the Lima stock exchange at $35 million.  The government, however, could not sell CPT to 
foreign investors because of problems with the company’s title to many of its assets.  The Peruvians put together a 
hotshot legal team to create a legal title that would meet the standardized property norms required by the global 
economy…..Three years later, CPT entered the world of liquid capital and was sold for $2 billion—37 times its 
previous market valuation. That’s what a good property system can do.”  Hernando de Soto, The Secret of 
Nonsuccess; The property systems of the developing world exclude the poor from capitalism, TIME LATIN AMERICA, 
INTERNATIONAL EDITION (April 16, 2001), p. 64.   7
incumbents to serve as cartel enforcement devices.This regulatory capture was apparent at the 
genesis of radio regulation in the United States.  Rights to use frequencies for radio broadcasting 
were initially assigned by priority-in-use rules using common law precedents associated with the 
doctrine of “right of user” and “adverse possession.” After becoming established in the early 
1920s, however, major commercial broadcasters formed a trade association that urged Congress 
to enact a “public interest” licensing scheme to substitute for property rules (Dill 1938).  The 
result was that competitors of the commercial stations, including a large number of non-profits, 
were eliminated from the market, and new entry was severely limited (Hazlett 1990, 1997). 
License rigidities form barriers to entry, as seen in low-power FM.  FCC rules have 
restricted FM radio stations to a minimum power of 6,000 watts.  Licensees are allocated 200 
kHz to utilize, while regulators additionally leave three adjacent 200 kHz channels idle on either 
side (to serve as interference “buffers”).  This effectively allocates some 800 kHz per licensed 
operator.  If given flexible use of such frequencies, or property rights, licensees could subdivide 
bandwidth, allowing thousands of low power stations to peacefully co-exist (Hazlett & Viani 
2003).  Rivalry between competitive high-power FM stations would force such entry, in fact, 
were such entry efficient.  Yet FCC license restrictions prohibit this. 
In short, wireless licenses convey use rights that have value, but they also impose use 
restrictions that have value given.  License rigidities increase the wealth of property owners by 
reducing exposure to external damage of the sort noted by Armen Alchian: “If I open a restaurant 
near yours and win away business with my superior service, you are as hurt as if I had burned 
part of your building” (Alchian 1965, p. 132).   
Consider the property right to be protected from the opening of “a nearby restaurant.”  It 
could be as valuable as fire insurance.  When conveyed in an asset sale, it would raise the offer 
price,  ceteris paribus. This is consistent with the evidence available concerning 
telecommunications privatization.   Wallsten (2003, p. 11) finds that explicit exclusivity 
provisions attached to privatized state phone companies resulted in “more than doubling the 
price investors” paid for assets (emphasis in original).    
The exclusive service rights packaged with state telephone privatizations is an important 
analogy to the limited rights associated with wireless phone licenses.  The exclusivity associated 
with the former is more apparent, however, in that monopolies are explicitly granted unique   8
rights.
11  Wireless licenses sold at auction are not monopoly rights, and contain terms that apply 
to multiple suppliers.  The restrictions they impose do not appear to advantage specific firms. 
But license rigidities create exclusive rights precisely because they are non-specific.   
Given that the rules limiting a particular wireless operator simultaneously limit actual and 
potential rivals, they are two-edged swords.  Instead of unambiguously increasing with the 
relaxation of license restrictions, license values may in fact decline.  An immediate result is that 
the property rights embedded in the wireless license are not properly valued as the sum of the 
values of each separate right.  This can be stated in the following way.  Assume that the rights 
delineated in a license are given as: 
 
Bundle of rights = R(a, b, …,z), 
 
where (a, b, …, z) is a vector of rights, each of which entitles the license holder to offer one 
distinct output via a particular delivery system (analog cellular phone calls to residential 
customers via a common carrier model, for instance, or digital paging for business users in New 
York City, as another).  The bundle is assumed to exhaust all the permissible business choices a 
licensee receives in being awarded a license; among these choices licensees select that mix 
which maximizes firm (and, therefore, license) value.   
The simple additive valuation implies that rights are economically independent: 
 
Value (Rights) =  V = Va + Vb…..+ Vz  , 
 
where V( ) is the expected present value operator.  This formulation assumes that the cross 
partials of the rights are zero: 
                                                 
11   This has not completely eliminated popular misunderstanding of the nature of monopoly rents.  Hernando de 
Soto’s argument for property rights (noted above) focused on the higher valuation associated with the improved 
rights package embedded in the privatized Peruvian phone company.  Yet, these rights were largely valuable in 
protecting the firm from competitive entry.   The company enjoyed a monopoly on local fixed telephony, national 
long distance and international service from June 1994 to June 1999 awarded to Telefonica. U.S. Department of 
Commerce. Office of Telecommunications Technologies (2001), http://infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/ot/mktctry. 
nsf/504ca249c786e20f85256284006da\7ab/81ac685ed4d2e66d8525659f006f575a!OpenDocument.  Two mobile 
phone licenses were awarded prior to privatization (one then bought by Telefonica with the other state phone 
company assets), and a third (competitive) license was not issued until May 7, 2000 (awarded to Telecom Italia).  




































  Where the rights interact so as to affect valuations, this condition will not hold.  Adding 
new rights to the bundle will then raise or lower the value of infra-marginal rights.  These pre-
existing entitlements may increase in value, as in the case of synergistic efficiencies, or decline 
in value, as when the incremental rights raise the probability of competitive entry.   Consider the 
example offered above, where AMPS cellular licensees are awarded the right to offer digital 
technologies, which generally cost more to deploy but which deliver far more capacity for phone 
calls or data, and substantially higher quality connections.   
  Assume that the operator’s license value = V, the first right (to deliver analog service) = 
Va, and the newly added right (to offer digital) = Vd.  Further assume identical operators, and that 
no other rights (or, more precisely, their market values) are affected by the new flexibility, and 
set them all equal to zero to focus on the incremental changes.   
 Initially,  V = Va.  After liberalization, V = Va + Vd.  Yet the extension of digital rights 
clearly lowers the value of analog rights, i.e., (∂V/∂Va)(∂Va/∂ V d) < 0.  With the prospect of 
digital competition, analog rights depreciate in value.  The direction of licensee wealth change is 
determined by whether a a d V V V > +
' , or vice versa, where 
'
a V = value of analog rights after 
digital rights are issued (or, more precisely, anticipated).   
  An argument can be made that the cross partials are constrained to be non-negative, as 
the grant of a right to one licensee does not technically convey to others.  In the standard case, 
this is incorrect.  License rules are not divisible per individual licenses, but are created for 
categories of licenses.
12  Here, additional rights are distributed across users such that expanding 
the bundle for one operator simultaneously subjects that operator to potential entry.  Moreover, 
were rights packages customized, property rights would continue to be lumpy.  That is, a given 
bundle of spectrum rights is implicitly linked to those of potential competitors because the 
precedent it creates may be duplicated.  How additional property rights granted to one party 
shape financial market expectations about future profits is the key empirical question.  Policies to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Concesiones Otorgadas Para Servicions Publicos de Telecomunicaciones al (Nov. 11, 2002), 
http://www.mtc.gob.pe/comunicaciones/uect/conc98tel.htm (website visited July 12, 2002).   10
extend spectrum rights carry the potential to undercut valuable entry barriers.  It is therefore an 
open question as to how property rights awards affect licensee wealth.  The view that “Fully 
flexible” licenses are “hence more valuable” (Calabrese 2003, p. 4) is not axiomatic, but a 
testable hypothesis.  
 
4. Spectrum Allocation Policy 
  
In the standard spectrum allocation system, such as that employed in the United States, 
private ownership of frequencies is prohibited.  Regulators allocate spectrum and markets are 
precluded from reallocating it.
13  This is done by “block allocation,” which establishes 
permissible uses for given bands. This zoning process also sets operating standards, determines 
business models (licensed v. unlicensed use; private carriage v. common carriage; commercial v. 
noncommercial; ad-supported v. subscription-based; etc.), and establishes parameters that will 
shape, if not fix, market structure.  This latter includes the size and frequency location of the 
spectrum allocation.  In licensed bands, spectrum users are permitted to operate only according 
to the terms of a license.  Aggregation and subdivision rules, the method of license assignment, 
and the number of licenses allocated are key regulatory decisions.  In unlicensed bands, the 
transmitting equipment (rather than the user) is regulated, and this is done by “type acceptance” 
(a manufacturer obtains permission to sell a particular device rather than having a license for 
each). Key decisions here include allowable power limits and determination of allowable 
technical standards.  
  Radio interference results when emissions for one use degrade other wireless services.  
This spillover imposes costly limitations; the use of more sophisticated technology typically 
serves to maintain service quality in the face of interfering radio emissions, at additional cost.    
The standard policy limits interference indirectly, regulating use of frequencies by determining 
permissible activities.  So, for example, U.S. television stations, which broadcast on 6 MHz 
channels, are licensed by the FCC such that the geographical spacing of transmission towers, 
                                                                                                                                                             
12   In the United States, for example, the rules defining a given licensee’s rights are enumerated not in the license 
itself but in the associated rule making.  There, regulators spell out the options and duties of a class of licensees. 
13   Secondary markets in radio spectrum are now being actively considered by several countries, including the U.S.   
This implies a fundamental departure from the standard regulatory model.  See Hazlett 2004.  It should be noted that 
reforms to introduce such “frequency trading” are narrowly tailored, excluding important (and highly valuable) 
reallocations as, for example, television band spectrum to mobile telephone use.  See FCC 2003.   11
power and antenna height limits, and frequency assignments permit a certain level of reception 
quality for viewers using set-top or roof-top antennae.  Rather than defining a 6 MHz spectrum 
space, a contour defined with respect to geography and frequency (including limits for out-of-
band emissions), the licensed broadcaster is given an exact location, power, and transmission 
technology by regulators.  Adjacent frequencies are left unoccupied as buffers (or “taboo” 
channels).  And implicit determination is made of the expense which households must bear in 
purchasing equipment to receive signals.  In short, the myriad interference trade-offs are made by 
regulators as they allocate spectrum. 
  Formally, the administrative process is top-down: the regulator first sets rules, wireless 
service providers then use the spectrum.  In practice, however, regulators react to proposals 
brought to them by the market.  This is because virtually all information about the demand and 
supply of wireless services is held by private actors.  To create coherent rules, regulators must 
rely on this information.  Hence, the spectrum allocation system is structured as an application 
processing agency.  Petitions are filed by parties attempting to use spectrum in various ways not 
already authorized.  Those with relevant information have economic incentives to reveal it.    
  Four nations have instituted policies that substantially deviate from this structure.   
Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala, and El Salvador have effectively liberalized their regimes to 
allow market allocation of radio spectrum.
14  The policies pursued in these countries allow 
wireless licensees decidedly more freedom to utilize radio spectrum allocated to operating 
permits.  This qualitative judgment is rendered by examination of three broad categories of 
license deregulation: (1) business model; (2) services (outputs); (3) technical standards (inputs).  
A summary is provided in Table 1. 
  The standard spectrum policy approach configures licenses so that important business 
decisions in one or more of these categories are dictated by license terms.  There are instances 
wherein regulators choose not to regulate one or more dimensions of licensee operation, but 
these exceptions to the general pattern are case by case.  The distinction of spectrum allocation 
rules in the four liberal regimes is that the regulator is constrained not to impose such rules.   
 
 
                                                 
14   Hayne 1997; Crandall 1998; Spiller & Cardillo 1998; Hazlett 2001; Cave 2002, pp. 88-9; Hazlett and Ibarguen 
2002; Ibarguen 2003.   12
Australia 
  Australia explicitly rejected the standard approach to spectrum allocation with reforms 
promulgated in the Radiocommunications Act of 1992.  “Australia was one of the first countries 
to recognise the potential for market-based reforms, using property rights, to increase efficiency 
in spectrum use” (Productivity Commission 2002, xxx).  This view has been echoed by 
international regulatory bodies.
15  The policy change has been described by a key participant 
thusly: 
 
National administrations have traditionally relied on a centrally planned model to 
manage spectrum.  This has involved planning the use for parts of the spectrum at 
a national level, consistent with international conventions, and then issuing device 
specific licenses following these plans… 
 
Australia has recently developed and implemented a property-like rights regime in 
radiofrequency spectrum, giving licensees unprecedented flexibility to buy and 
sell spectrum as a resource in an open market... (Hayne 1997, p. 1). 
 
  Property rights in radio spectrum are delineated by Standard Trading Units (STUs), 
analogous to “cubes of spectrum space” (Hayne 1997, p. 17).   These rights are defined in 
frequency space, time and geographic location (ACA 2000, Ch. 4: 2-3). “[L]icensees are free to 
deploy any technology, any device, from any site in their license” (Hayne 1997, 18).  The result 
is that “A licensee wanting to introduce a new technology can enter the market place and buy the 
                                                 
15  In an International Telecommunications Union briefing paper, the regime is described thusly:  “A profound 
reform in the regulatory environment resulted in the establishment of the Radiocommunications Act 1992 and the 
Australian Communications Authority Act 1997, which are the main instruments for spectrum management in 
Australia. The presence of an independent, strong and skilled spectrum regulatory body, the establishment of 
market-driven approaches — such as the attribution of property rights on spectrum to licensees allowed to trade their 
assets, the spectrum licensing scheme based on technological neutrality and trading, the allocation of spectrum using 
price-based methods, the delegation of licensing powers to assigned persons within the industry, a streamlined self-
declaration compliance arrangement for radio equipment, electronic and electrical products-and a highly effective 
consultation-based process for the implementation, revision and improvement of the regulatory framework — make 
Australia a unique benchmark of modern spectrum management administration” (Leite 2004, 7).   13
spectrum space it needs directly, without having to wait for the planning cycle to make provision 
for that technology (Ibid., p. 17).
16 
  Regulators authorize lots, or blocks, of STUs.  Although STUs could be as small as 0.250 
MHz wide in the 2 GHz band, the license that results from aggregating STUs needs a contiguous 
minimum bandwidth of five megahertz in the 1.9-2.1 GHz range or one megahertz in the 800-
900 MHz band (Ibid Ch. 4: 8).
17  STUs trade freely, but transactions must be registered (Ibid, Ch. 
4: pp. 4, 7-8).  Rights are issued for a period of 15 years.  Renewal is via competitive bidding 
(Ibid Ch. 4: 11).
18 
  The government initiates the creation and sale of STU lots.  The Australian 
Communications Authority (ACA) prepares a frequency band plan and receives public 
comment.
19  Once the band plan is in place, the Minister of Economic Development provides a 
written notice authorizing assignment of spectrum rights.
20  The regulator then prepares a 
“marketing plan,” in which it announces an auction of spectrum licenses.  This specifies the lots 





  The government of New Zealand defines “management rights,” and as of 2002 had issued 
63 to private holders, another 18 to public bodies (Productivity Commission 2002, 149).   These 
rights endow a band manager with the authority to determine technologies, services, and 
business models used within the allocated frequency space.  “The rights allow flexibility of 
spectrum use, subject only to interference constraints” (Ibid., 148).  Rights are issued by the 
Secretary of Commerce via a competitive bidding process.  Band managers also have the 
authority to issue “spectrum licenses” which allow other users or operators to employ bandwidth 
within the manager’s band.  In essence, the government cedes regulatory control over 
                                                 
16 Hayne contrasts this to the U.S. system where, even in its most liberal spectrum allocation, that for personal 
communications services (PCS), rights were more rigidly configured.  “The US [PCS] auctions were for ‘licenses’ 
following the traditional centrally planned apparatus license approach” (Hayne 1997, p. 20). 
17 See also: Australian Communications Authority, Radiocommunications (Trading rules for spectrum licenses) 
Determination 1998 (May 29, 1998); http://www.aca.gov.au/aca_home/legislation/radcomm/determinations/ 
trade/s88rules.pdf.  
18  See also Radiocommunications Act 1992 with Amendments Up to Act No. 125 of 2002, Articles 78 and 81. 
19  Radiocommunications Act 1992 with Amendments Up to Act No. 125 of 2002, Articles 32-33. 
20  Radiocommunications Act 1992 with Amendments Up to Act No. 125 of 2002, Articles 36. 
21  Radiocommunications Act 1992 with Amendments Up to Act No. 125 of 2002, Articles 39.    14
frequencies to private parties, which then allocate the use of radio spectrum.  Rivalry between 
band managers disciplines de facto spectrum owners. 
  The creation of management rights comes upon the initiative of the government.
22  
Management rights give the holder exclusive control over a range of frequencies for a 20 year 
period.
23  These rights are transferable in part or in whole.
24  The transfer or alteration of these 
rights requires prior approval of the Secretary of Commerce.
25  At expiration, the band 
manager’s rights (and licenses assigned by the manager) transfer to the Crown.
26 
  Management rights provide full flexibility in the choice of technologies and services.  
Interference limits define a manager’s frequency space, and these limits must be observed by 
those licensed by the band manager to use frequencies.
27  All spectrum users of frequencies 
(including band managers) are required to hold a spectrum license.  Spectrum licenses provide 
the right to transmit within a certain frequency range and to be protected from harmful 
interference as specified in the underlying management rights.
28  Band managers and spectrum 
licensees negotiate to set conditions for transferability, use, duration, etc., of spectrum licenses.
29  
A Registrar records transactions, and insures that modifications or transfers do not violate the 
management right associated with the license.
30 
                                                 
22 “From time to time the Ministry invites public submissions on the management of certain frequency 
bands…(…)…These invitations to make submissions do not constitute a commitment by the Secretary of 
Commerce to grant any radio apparatus license or create, tender or otherwise dispose of any management rights or 
licenses.”  Ministry of Commerce, Draft Management Plan 2 GHz Band (1.7-2.3 GHz). (June 1997, p. 17). 
23 Ministry of Economic Development, Radiocommunications Act , Discussion Paper 14 (2000, p.1). 
24 Radiocommunications Act of 1989 with Amendments Up to 2002, Articles 43-45. 
25 “The Purchaser or a Nominated Associate may with the prior written consent of the Secretary transfer, assign or 
create any registered interest in, or Controlling Interest in relation to, the Management Rights in favour of any 
person who is not: (a) the Purchaser itself; or (b) a Nominated Associate.” Clauses 4.2 and 4.4, Management Rights 
Deed.  Ministry of Economic Development, Auction 3 http://auction.med.govt.nz/.  See also Radiocommunications 
Act of 1989 with Amendments Up to 2002, Article 11B. 
26 Ministry of Economic Development, Radiocommunications Act. Discussion Paper 14 (2000, pp.1-2) 
27 Management rights include technical specifications such as emission limits between adjacent frequencies, 
protection limits in the frequency band, including the power floor.  These parameters enable managers to specify 
rights conveyed in spectrum licenses they issue (Radiocommunications Act of 1989 with Amendments up to 2002, 
Article 34).  See also Ministry of Commerce, Draft Management Plan 2 GHz Band (1.7-2.3 GHz). (June 1997, p. 7). 
28 This includes: “(a) the right to transmit on a frequency band, and the right to have no harmful interference from 
co-channel emissions in the protection area on the frequency band within the range of frequencies specified in the 
manager’s record of management rights; or (b) the right to transmit on a frequency band within the range of 
frequencies specified in the manager’s record of management rights; or (c) the right to have no harmful interference 
from co-channel emissions in the protection area on a frequency band within the range of frequencies specified in 
the manager’s record of management rights.” Radiocommunications Act of 1989 with Amendments Up to 2002, 
Article 48. 
29 Radiocommunications Act of 1989 with Amendments Up to 2002, Articles 49, 55. 
30 Radiocommunications Act of 1989 with Amendments Up to 2002, Article 25.   15
Guatemala
31 
  According to the International Telecommunications Union, Guatemala has “probably the 
world’s most liberal radio spectrum regulatory model.”
32  Pursuant to a 1996 reform enacted by 
statute, property interests are assigned for the use of radio frequencies: Titulo de usufructo de 
frecuencia (TUFs).  Such devices define ownership by specifying:  
 
  a.  the band or frequency ranges; 
  b.  hours of operation; 
  c.  geographical coverage area; 
  d.  maximum effective radiated power by the TUF holder; 
  e.  maximum field strength or signal strength on the border of the coverage area; 
  f.  order and title number; 
  g.  issue date and expiration; 
  h.  name of title holder; 
 i.   
 blank spaces for the endorsement of the TUF for reassignment to another party.
33 
 
  Any interested person or entity is entitled to request a frequency, triggering the TUF 
assignment process.
34  The independent regulator is constrained to issue requested, non-
conflicting rights, and a public database registers where such rights have already been issued.  
Petitions are subject to opposition on the grounds of radio interference with existing services, but 
strict time limits for adjudication, as well as binding arbitration mandates, are designed to block 
excessive administrative barriers to entry.    
  Requests to obtain TUFs are made public and competing applicants are given a short 
period in which to file competing requests.  Where no rival claims are made, the TUF is issued to 
the party requesting it without charge (i.e., no reservation prices for assignment).
35  Where rival 
claims are made, competitive bidding assigns the license to the high bidder, with strict time 
limits again imposed for the regulator-held auction. TUFs are issued for a period of 15 years, and 
                                                 
31   This sub-section is based on Ibarguen 2002, Hazlett & Ibarguen 2002, and Ibarguen 2003. 
32  Intenational Telecommunications Union, Radiocommunications: SPU newslog on radiocommunication issues 
(Dec. 19, 2003), http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/categories/radiocommunications/2003/12/19.html. 
33 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 94-96 (Oct. 17, 1996, Article 57).  A copy of the 
TUF form is featured in Hazlett (2001, p. 447). 
34 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 94-96 (Oct. 17, 1996, Article 61).   16
are renewable for an equal period of time unless it can be proven that the frequencies were never 
used.
36  These rights may be transferred or subdivided without approval by the regulatory 
agency.
37  Right holders are free to choose the technology and type of service for which the 
frequencies are to be used.  
   
El Salvador 
  The Salvadorian government instituted similar reforms to those in Guatemala in a 1997 
statute.
38  Concessions for the use of frequencies extend for a 20 year period, and can be 
transferred or subdivided in frequency, geographic, and time dimension without prior approval.
39  
Concession holders are free to choose technologies.  Regulators establish a National Table of 
Frequency Allocation which describes the type of service for which the assigned frequencies are 
to be used for,
40 but rights holders are free to deviate from the Table without penalty.  This 
results in generic license flexibility.
41   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
35 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 94-96 (Oct. 17, 1996, Article 61) 
36 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 94-96 (Oct. 17, 1996, Article 59). 
37 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 94-96 (Oct. 17, 1996) and Amendments in Decrees 
115-97 and 47-2002, Articles 55-56, 58. 
38  Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997).   
39 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997, Articles 15-16). The transfer of 
concession rights is treated as a private contract and must be registered in the telecommunications registry of the 
regulator (Reglamento de la Ley de Creacion de la Superintendencia General de Electricidad y 
Telecommunicaciones. Executive Decree No. 56. May 13, 1998, Articles 19, 27).  Concession holders are liable for 
violations, including out of band emissions.  Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 
6, 1997, Article 15). 
40 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997: Articles 10). See also Regulation 
of the Law of Telecommunications. Executive Decree No. 64 (May 15, 1988: Article 52).  At the time a concession is 
awarded, the regulator issues a document called a “Resolution” in which the characteristics of the concession are 
specified. This includes: “(a) a reference to the fulfillment of the dispositions of the CNAF [national table of 
frequency allocation] that are applicable, and,  (b) the technical background of the system in terms of the service to 
offer; central frequency and bandwidth of the transmitting stations; geographical locations of the fixed transmitting 
stations; coverage area or link direction; operation timetable; nominal power of the transmitters; effective maximum 
radiated power; maximum intensity of the electrical field in the surrounding of the covered area; modulation type; 
type,  gain and pattern of the radiation of the antennas of the transmitter stations;  type,  gain and pattern of reception 
of the antennas of the receiving stations, whenever they have to be protected; altitude and location of the antennas 
above the terrain level and above sea level; and a spectrum diagram of the signals emitted by the transmitters after 
the filtering state, as it corresponds.”    Regulation of the Law of Telecommunications. Executive Decree No. 64 
(May 15, 1988: Article 55).  
41   The classification of services, while non-binding, may provide a coordinating function.  In any event, service 
categories are provided by International Telecommunications Union allocations (non-binding agreements between 
countries) and by international markets for telecommunications equipment.  A small country’s spectrum, even in the 
most open regulatory environment, will largely conform to world markets to capture economies of scale in 
manufacturing transmission and receiving equipment.     17
  Any interested person or entity may request frequency rights from the regulator.
42  The 
Law establishes a tight timeframe for the adjudication of petitions and assignments. Requests are 
made public and are subject to opposition by interested parties, either on the grounds of 
interference with existing services, or by a rival claim for the rights.  Interference disputes are 
adjudicated on a short timeline via negotiations buttressed by binding arbitration.  If no mutually 
exclusive claim is registered, requested rights are assigned to the petitioning party upon payment 
of a reservation price set in the General Telecommunications Law.  In case of competing claims, 
the frequencies are awarded to the highest bidder in a public auction.
43  Frequency rights are 
renewable but, when competing claims exists, concessions are auctioned.
44 
 
5. Wireless License Auctions 
 
  Licenses to provide wireless services were traditionally issued by governments 
administratively (“beauty contests”) or via lotteries (Hazlett 1998).  In 1989, however, New 
Zealand authorized the use of competitive bidding; its first wireless license auction was 
conducted in 1990 (Crandall 1998).  The United States likewise authorized auctions in 1993, and 
competitive bidding for government assignments began in 1994.  Many countries have followed. 
 
  The adoption of auctions generates market data on the value of wireless licenses.  These 
data are useful for measuring windfalls associated with policies granting licensees relatively 
larger bundles of private property rights.  To sharpen the focus of this cross-country comparison, 
we restrict our analysis to wireless telephone licenses, both 2G and 3G,
45 and ignore other 
services which are less uniform and more difficult to value.  For licenses issued in our sub-
sample of countries assigning relatively liberal spectrum rights, wireless telephone licenses are 
defined with respect to the services delivered (as the clear regulatory delineation supplied 
elsewhere is lacking). 
                                                 
42 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997: Articles 3, 13) 
43 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997: Articles 76-82) 
44 Ley General de Telecomunicaciones. Legislative Decree No. 142 (Nov. 6, 1997: Articles 99-100). 
45 Second generation (digital telephone service) and third generation (digital voice and data service).  In the 
marketplace, the licenses compete to provide wireless telecommunications. First generation cellular (analog) phone 
licenses were typically assigned prior to the advent of auctions.   18
  A general overview of the license auction process is nicely detailed in Cramton (2002).  
To obtain more extensive data on license sales prices and country-specific variables, we 
compiled a unique dataset encompassing 42 license auctions conducted in 27 different countries 
between 1995 and 2001.  In aggregate, some 1438 licenses are included, with nearly 1,100 of 
those being accounted for by the United States.  These data are summarized in Appendix 1.  Data 
on auction winners, winning bids, auction type, spectrum allocation, and industry structure are 
mainly taken from the following sources: each country’s telecommunications regulator and 
communications ministry; Pyramid Research; the Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire 
database; the European Commission; and the European Radio Communications Office.  Country 
data such as population, income, urbanization, etc., are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  Where a country is divided into sub-national license areas (such as 
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and the U.S), demographic data specific to each 
license area were obtained from the auction information packages and each country’s Census 
Bureau.
46 Country data on fixed telephony prices, and fixed and mobile telephone penetration 
rate are from the International Telecommunications Union’s World Telecommunications 
Indicators 2002 database.  Summary statistics over the entire dataset are presented in Table 2. 
 
6. Property Rights Value Trade-Offs 
 
  A wireless license issued by a regulatory agency grants an operator a bundle of rights.  
These include commercial opportunities to provide communications services using radio waves 
according to license rules.
47   With initial assignments made via competitive bidding across a 
differentiated sample of countries (diverse with respect to spectrum property rights regimes), we 
may explore how prices differ depending on the extent of the rights issued wireless operators. 
  The bidding process establishes the market price of a license, PL, reflecting the expected 
profits flowing from the rights assigned, such that 
                                                 
46 Typically each auction information package has data of population in each license area but not on income per 
capita.  For these six countries, data of per capita income in each license area was obtained for each county’s Bureau 
of Census except for the U.S. where Rand McNally’s "Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide 2001" 132nd Edition 
was the source.  To keep consistency between the license area per capita income of these six countries and the rest, 
we first estimate for each license area the ratio of its per capita income to national income and then multiply this 
ratio times the World Bank estimates of gross per capita national income.   
47 These rules may be explicitly stated in the operating license, explicitly stated in statutes or other government 
regulations ancillary to the license, or implicitly established by regulatory or judicial precedents.   19
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where α  denotes the degree to which the license auction extracts the expected present value of 
the commercial opportunity granted by the license (0 < α  < 1), πt = expected profits in period t, 
T = expected life (number of periods) of the license rights, and r = the risk-adjusted discount 
rate.    
  Wireless licenses convey a bundle of commercial opportunities (or options) and impose a 
vector of regulatory constraints.  Expected profits, which are a function of expected revenues and 
costs, vary as the configuration of license rights varies.  A license that allows an operator to 
provide wireless telephone service, paging, messaging, data, games, interactive video, and high-
speed Internet access would be valued differently from a license that allocated the same 
bandwidth but awarded solely the option to offer interactive video.  Similarly, a license that 
mandated a specific analog transmission standard would be valued differently from one granting 
the licensee greater discretion in selecting technical standards.    
  For a given license, expected profits increase with the range of service opportunities, 
technology choices, and business model options, ceteris paribus.  The license conveys rights in 
these three dimensions (outputs, inputs, organization), but for simplicity we here ‘homogenize’ 
the rights issued and consider the license as a vector of rights bundles, each bundle specifying 
the package of rights conveyed to the licensee in all three dimensions.  There are assumed to be J 
such bundles, with j = 1, 2, 3…, J defining a given license, L.   For example, j=1 could denote 
the bundle of rights authorizing operation of a cellular telephone network in a given area 
according to FCC rules in place in 1986.    This bundle could be augmented with j=2, say, which 
allows licensees to provide the same set of services permitted by j=1, but additionally permits 
the operator to utilize a digital (as opposed to analog) transmission technology.
48  Similarly, 1986 
cellular licenses contained site licensing requirements, wherein each base station (receiving and 
transmitting to handsets within a cell) would be specifically authorized.  A rights bundle, say 
j=3, could award all the options of previous bundles with the additional grant of “geographic 
                                                 
48 Such rights were granted to U.S. cellular licensees in 1988.  It should be noted that the mandate to continue to 
provide analog service to customers equipped with analog devices was not then relaxed, so the expanded right 
included an additional option but not the option to abandon an existing mandate.      20
licensing,” giving the operator the right to determine base station locations without regulatory 
approval.
49 
  Each license conveys a bundle of rights.  Each bundle, in turn, generates expectations for 
revenues and costs, which determine the profit opportunity such that:  
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The expected value of these bundles then determines the value of the license award.  So, by 
substitution from Equation (1): 
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  Aggregation of the values of J rights determines PL.  When a license is viewed in 
isolation, the increase in property rights appears to unambiguously increase license value.  But 
license rights allocations are “lumpy.”  Classes of licenses are defined in similar ways, such that 
rights configured for one license spill over to other licenses, altering market structures and 
triggering pecuniary externalities.  It is theoretically possible for specific terms in a specific 
license to be changed by a regulatory action that has no other direct effect, and has only small 
precedent-setting influence on anticipations.
50  This isolated margin offers what is an exception 
to the common rule: spectrum usage rights are created in clusters.  Rights created for one license 
are anticipated to be influential, if not explicitly determinative, of rights assigned to others.  
  Incorporating this insight does not preclude the special case where license rights are 
correctly valued without regard to spillover rights, but generalizes the analysis to include the 
possibility that an expansion of license rights may increase anticipated profits from additional 
revenues (say, from the right to offer more services) or cost savings (say, from the right to 
deploy an innovative technology), while simultaneously reducing profit expectations by raising 
the probability of competitive, price-lowering entry in output markets the previous configuration 
of license rights authorized the licensee to serve. 
                                                 
49 Geographic license rights are often very important because of the inflexibility, economic uncertainty, and 
administrative expense associated with securing government approval to local specific radio equipment.  National 
wireless phone carriers in the United States maintain networks of about 20,000 base stations; there are now over 
147,000 such stations in the country (CTIA 2003).   
50   The award of a monopoly license by a dictator to his only child might produce such an outcome, for example.      21
  In this case, the gains from expanded rights may be more than offset by the effective loss 
in exclusivity.  The ceteris paribus assumption is violated when the value of specific license 
rights are aggregated.   This means that expanding the bundle of rights encompassed in the 
license can result in the license owner enjoying either a positive or a negative windfall. 
 
7. Empirical Framework 
 
  Do wireless licenses with more expansive property rights tend to be priced higher than 
similar licenses with fewer property rights?  By comparing license values across countries, 
estimating the marginal effect of regimes with liberal rights, we may learn the answer.  We focus 
here on licenses allowing firms to provide wireless telephony, a comparable service offered 
internationally.  We restrict our evaluation to countries issuing licenses via competitive bidding, 
as this yields public data on license prices.   
  We estimate the value of wireless phone licenses issued by auction in various countries.  
All countries for which data could be compiled were included in the sample.  Prices are assumed 
to be a function of the anticipated demand for wireless services, industry structure, cost of 
capital, type of auction mechanism, license term, and the extent of the property rights embedded 
in the license, in the following reduced form model estimated in a log-log regression:   
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  The price of license i auctioned by country j at time t (date of auction close)
51 per person 
(commonly known as price per MHz per pop) is assumed to be a function of included variables, 
explained as follows.  Market structure (HHI) measures the level of competitive pressure that 
will constrain firm profitability.  It is included as a predicted value in that future (rather than 
current) market conditions incorporate licenses being auctioned at time t, and because license 
bidders are rationally forward-looking.  The predicted value is a linear extrapolation of the trend 
                                                 
51 Price data were obtained from websites of country regulators.  See Appendix 2 for a summary of sources.   22
in the Hirshman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) in evidence at time t, and calculated at t=3 (three years 
beyond the auction).
52  The coefficient on HHI is expected to be positive. 
  Income per capita (GNPPC)
53 is included as a demand shifter, with higher incomes 
expected to increase profitability and, hence, license bids.  It is calculated within the region 
covered by the license being auctioned.  Bandwidth allocated to the license (WIDTH) measures 
an important input which, under the terms of the license, can be utilized by the licensee to 
provide service.
54  Measured in MHz, the broader the bandwidth, the more communications may 
be delivered at a given cost.  Hence, it is anticipated to be positively related to license prices.  
The population in the licensed service territory (POP) is a measure of scale, and should be 
associated with a positive estimated coefficient if economies of scale are in evidence.   
Urbanization (URB) measures the ratio of the country living in urban areas, and is expected to be 
positively related to license prices for the same reason that the density variable (DENSE), which 
is the average population per square kilometer,  is expected to be positively related to the 
dependent variable.  More concentrated populations are believed to be more economical to serve 
with cellular telephone systems, as more users can share a given base station. 
  The cost of capital is an important component of the demand for licenses.  Here, the level 
of the Nasdaq index at auction time is used to capture investment sentiments which encompass 
capital costs.
55  As capital assets, wireless license values vary with the discount rate, expectations 
about risk, and expectations about growth.  Alternative empirical measures, including interest 
rates and other stock market indices, also capture much of this information.  The Nasdaq Index, 
however, was selected because it is a broad indicator of investor sentiment toward risky assets in 
the technology sector, reflecting discount rates as well as expectations about risk and growth.   
  Some licenses have been allocated spectrum that the International Telecommunications 
Union has designated (via its non-binding planning mechanism) “3G,” “UMTS,” or “IMT-
2000.”  These are permitted to provide a range of advanced services, including high-speed 
Internet access.
56  This prospect should raise the value of such licenses to bidders.   
                                                 
52 The data go back from four to seven years in our sample, and are projected forward for three years via linear 
regression.  See Appendix 2 for the main sources. 
53  These data were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
54  Data obtained from regulatory websites.  See Appendix 2. 
55  Nasdaq index data are available at http://finance.yahoo.com/q?d=t&s=^IXIC.  
56 The UMTS (3G) factsheet circulated by the Swiss Federal Office of Communications stated: “UMTS capability 
will allow a range of new services which today’s GSM networks are not (yet) able to provide…(…)…The following 
incomplete list gives a brief summary of the possible range of services: Videotelephony; videoconferencing; video   23
  Alternatively, wireless phone licenses have been allocated spectrum in different 
frequency bands, which has important economic effects.  Radio signal strength declines with 
distance from the transmitter, a phenomenon known as “path loss.” Higher frequency 
transmissions have higher path losses, all else equal (Reed 1992, 61-62).  Higher path loss 
implies more cell sites, and thus higher capital expenditures to produce a given level of service.
57 
Wireless phone services are offered in two broad zones: 800-900 MHz and 1700-2300 MHz.  A 
dichotomous variable (MHZ) is set equal to unity for licenses allocated spectrum in the 800-900 
MHz range.
58  This variable should be positively related to license price. 
  The price of a three minute phone call on the fixed (wireline) phone system (FCALL) by 
peak-time residential phone users is included as a regressor, as is the one-time connection fee for 
residential telephone service (FCONN).
59  These variables should be positively related to license 
prices if fixed and wireless phone services are primarily substitutes.  It is possible, however, that 
the services may be seen by license bidders as complementary, however. 
  A dummy variable was included to identify whether or not the auction was first-price 
sealed bid (AUCT).
60  Experiments reveal a tendency for first-price sealed-bid auctions to 
produce larger revenues than other auction types (Coppinger, Smith & Titus 1991; Cox, 
Roberson & Smith 1991).
61  These results appear to hold in common value auctions with 
inexperienced bidders (Levin, Kagel & Richard 1996; Kagel 1995), but are ambiguous when 
experienced bidders participate (Levin, Kagel & Richard 1996).
62  The model to be estimated 
should produce evidence about this empirical issue. 
                                                                                                                                                             
and audio clips; voice service; online shopping and online banking; mobile internet access; map services, location 
based services (navigation services incorporating sections of maps); email.” OFCOM, UMTS Factsheet (Dec 14, 
2000), 3.  
57 Estimates made by GTE “predict that the cost of RF [radio frequency] equipment increases roughly 10 percent for 
every doubling in frequency… Thus using 2 GHz frequencies for PCS suggests RF equipment will cost roughly 15 
percent more than comparable cellular circuitry operating  at 800 MHz” (Reed 1992, p. 15-16).   
58  See Appendix 2 for country data sources. 
59  Fixed line phone rates were taken from the International Telecommunications Union’s World 
Telecommunications Indicators 2002 database.  
60  See Appendix 2 for the source of auction rules. 
61 With independent private values and symmetric, risk-neutral bidders, English, Dutch, first-price sealed-bid and 
second-price sealed-bid auctions generate equal revenue (Riley and Samuelson 1981; Myerson 1981).  If bidders are 
risk-averse, first price sealed-bid auctions provide higher expected revenues than English and second-price auctions 
(McAfee & McMillan 1987, p. 718-719).    See also Vickrey (1961) and Krishna (2002).   With symmetric risk-
averse bidders, revenues from a first price auction are higher than in a second price auction (Holt 1980). 
62 Again, experimental results diverge from the theory.  When bidder’s valuation includes common and independent 
private value elements, Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that the English auctions produce the highest expected 
revenues with risk-neutral bidders.   24
  The duration of the rights granted (TERM) is included,
63 and is predicted to be positively 
associated with license value.  Since wireless licenses are rarely revoked or not renewed, the 
magnitude of the effect may be small, however.  Moreover, even regimes which invoke 
competitive bidding for license renewals may generate little revenue (i.e., impose only a modest 
renewal tax) if potential bidders are deterred from serious auction participation because the 
incumbent appears to value the license most highly (Gilbert & Newbery 1982).  In sum, a license 
with a shorter duration is anticipated to have higher transaction costs associated with renewal, 
regardless of whether renewal rights are auctioned, but the size of these costs may not be large.   
  The identity of the winning bidder is indicated by a dummy variable, INCUMB = 1 if 
licensee is an incumbent wireless telephone carrier providing service in the market covered by 
the license.
64  Theoretically, licenses are worth more to incumbents both due to possible 
synergies available from aggregating new rights with complementary existing rights, and from 
preclusionary value derived from denying a entrant the opportunity to increase competitive 
pressures in output or input markets (Cramton 2002).  How this increased private valuation alters 
market prices is complicated, however.  For a given set of bidders, incumbent-won auctions 
could be higher, reflecting incumbent’s more aggressive bidding strategies.  Potential entrants 
may be deterred from participating in auctions, which require certain costs to be sunk, given the 
knowledge that incumbents are likely to outbid them.  This latter effect tends to lower prices, and 
offset the first effect.  Hence, the net impact of incumbency is ambiguous. 
  A discrete variable is included to adjust for the general (not spectrum allocation-specific) 
property rights regime in the country auctioning a given license (LEGAL).  These data are taken 
from a global ranking of economic rights compiled by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney & Lawson 
2002). The index range is from 1 to 10, with higher values indicating more secure property 
rights.  In the sample the lowest value is for Guatemala (3.16) and the highest is for Netherlands 
(9.62), with the value for the United States = 9.23.  All else equal, demand for licenses should be 
higher where investors anticipate that the rights they purchase will not be appropriated by the 
government.  A dummy variable is also included to indicate that the license is issued by the 
United States (USA).  This is to mitigate the possibility that estimated results will be 
overwhelmed by the large proportion of U.S. licenses in the sample (1080 of 1438).  The large 
                                                 
63 See Appendix 2 for sources. 
64  Incumbents were identified mainly via information provided by regulatory websites.  See Appendix 2 for sources.   25
number of U.S. licenses is a product of regulators’ decisions to fragment license coverage areas 
to a high degree.
65  
  Finally, a dummy variable is included to indicate the presence of a liberal spectrum 
regime.  LIB = 1 when the license is issued by Australia, New Zealand, Guatemala, or El 
Salvador,  0 elsewise. As detailed above, the bundles of rights issued to wireless telephone 
operators in these countries are categorically more expansive than license rights awarded in other 
nations.  In fact, since the authorizations issued by liberal regimes do not delineate the range of 
outputs to be provided, the licenses auctioned for use in wireless telephony are identified by 
matching wireless phone networks to their wireless licenses, rather than the reverse.  This turns 
out not to be difficult in that international equipment markets produce obvious spectrum 
allocations for rational spectrum users with full flexibility. 
  The view that spectrum liberalization leads to positive windfalls for licensees is then 
tested by examining the estimated coefficient on this dummy variable.  A positive value indicates 
that more property rights increase licensee rents; a negative value suggests that the gain in 
productive choices is more than offset by the loss of exclusivity.  The latter would carry 
important implications for consumer welfare, in that it would reveal that investors (license 
bidders) anticipate lower quality-adjusted retail prices.




  Equation (4) was estimated using a log-log ordinary least squares specification and White 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.
67  Equation (4) was slightly altered by the addition 
of squared terms for bandwidth (Width) and population (POP) in the first estimated model (A).  
Results are reported in Table 4.  All estimated coefficients signed a priori appear consistent with 
conjectures, and 13 of 16 coefficients in Specification B are statistically different from zero at 
95% confidence. The hypothesis that three insignificant coefficients (on population squared, 
                                                 
65  The U.S. has issued over 50,000 licenses that, through secondary market transactions, have been aggregated into 
six major national wireless telephone networks as of early 2004.  (About 47,000 of these licenses are for specialized 
mobile radio service, however, and are not in the auctions database.)  Elsewhere, national licenses are typical.  See 
Hazlett 2003c.  
66 It is also possible that investors anticipate higher quality-adjusted input prices, as additional service providers 
compete.  This would expand efficient production in such inputs, and is therefore entirely consistent in producing 
consumer welfare gains.     
67 A Breusch–Pagan-Godfrey test rejects the hypothesis of homoskedastic errors.   26
800MHz, and license term) in Specification A were jointly equal to zero was tested.  The 
estimated statistic was F(3, 1289) =  0.08, with Prob > F = 0.9720.  Given that we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that these variables add no explanatory power, Model B, which omits these 
three variables, is selected as the preferred specification.  The results discussed below pertain, 
then, to Model B. 
  Overall, Model B appears to have a high degree of explanatory power.  Regression results 
indicate that income is positive and highly significant.  This is consistent with results for the PCS 
auctions in the U.S. (Ausubel et al., 1997).
68   As expected, the HHI, the NASDAQ index, the 3G 
dummy, and the 800/900 MHz dummy are all positively and significantly related to the price 
paid by the winning bidder.  The magnitude of these variables is large.  For example, licenses for 
3G service sold for about 45% more than other licenses, all else equal.
69  The proxy measuring 
economic liberty is also positive and significant, as is the proportion of population in urban 
areas, consistent with expectations. 
  Some interesting metrics are obtained by examining the coefficients on Bandwidth and 
Bandwidth squared in Model B.  Recall that “bandwidth” measures the frequency space allocated 
to the license being sold.  As anticipated, there is a positive (and significant) relationship 
between bandwidth and the winning bid.  In Specification B, one additional MHz of spectrum 
allocated to a license, a bandwidth increase of 7.95% at the mean sample value of 12.58 MHz, is 
associated with a price increase of about $11.5 million – 12.6% above the mean winning bid of 
$91.4 million.    
We also find that the size of the license generating the highest bid per MHz/pop.  Taking 
derivatives over the estimated Model B, yields:  
 
) ln( * 4856107 . 0 * 2 038712 . 3
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68  In slight contrast, Moreton & Spiller (1998) found no relationship between income and winning bids in the A&B 
block auction, but  found a positive relation in the C block auction. 
69 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) show that the percentage effect on the dependent variable is given by 
100*(exp(c) - 1), where c is the estimated coefficient for a regression dummy and the dependent variable is taken in 
logs.  See Table 4 for estimated magnitudes. 
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Setting this expression equal to zero indicates a maximum occurs at about 22.8 MHz.  License 
price (not adjusted for MHz) continues to increase until a bandwidth of about 63.97 MHz.  It 
should be noted that this slightly exceeds the maximum in-sample value.  Fixing the value of 
other variables at their means, we can simulate the effect of bandwidth over willingness to pay 
per MHz per pop as seen in Figure 1: 
 
Among the ambiguously signed variables, the effect of incumbency is positive 
and significant, as are the USA dummy and the Auction dummy.  Both estimated 
coefficients exceed one hundred percent. This latter result implies that sealed bid, 
first-price competitive bidding mechanisms have dramatically succeeded in 
extracting a higher proportion of license rents in the government auctions.  This is 
consistent with the practical experience gleaned from sequential bidding schemes, 
where auction participants have found strategic behavior relatively easy to 
execute.
70     
 
  The relationship between license prices and fixed telephone service fees, theoretically 
ambiguous, is a mixed picture.  While the telephone connection fee is positively related to 
wireless license prices, the price of a three-minute phone call is negatively related.  This does not 
appear to support either the view that wireless and wireline service are substitutes or 
complements.  Also of weak explanatory value are the variables for density and license term.  
The costs associated with license renewals do not appear to be of major concern to bidders. 
  The coefficient of primary interest is that associated with the Liberal Dummy.  This is 
estimated to be negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  The 
magnitude is impressive.  At mean values, a license sold in a liberal spectrum regime is valued at 
about 38% below an identical license sold with fewer property rights.  This suggests that the 
“windfall” licensees receive from an expected bundle of rights is more than offset by the 
reduction in value a more competitive market inflicts on the inframarginal rights held.   
  A scatter diagram of license prices (measured in $/per MHz/pop) and income per capita 
presents this result in an interesting way.  In Figure 2, which uses logarithmic scales, mean 
                                                 
70 Klemperer (2002a, 2002b) argues in favor of first price sealed bid auctions in lieu of ascending auctions on the 
evidence that collusion is less likely, and entry more likely, under first price sealed bid rules.   28
auction prices are plotted against income per capita.  Each axis plots values relative to the sample 
mean.  Data points are characterized according to the quadrant in which they fall.  Of eight 
license auctions in liberal spectrum regimes, just one auction produces prices that fall above the 
fitted line.  The outlier was an Australian auction held in March 2000, the month the NASDAQ 
index peaked at 5132.52 (March 10 intraday high).
71 
  Licenses awarding substantially more property rights appear to be capitalized in financial 
markets for substantially less.
72   Less obvious is that lower income countries with higher prices 
(upper left quadrant) also feature relatively high market concentration in wireless telephony.  
Brazil, Morocco, Panama and Bulgaria specifically reflect this.   Brazil had a monopoly in 
wireless telephony in most states with a national average HHI = 9,469.  Likewise, Morocco 
featured a monopoly wireless telephone carrier (Maroc telecom) at the time of its auction.  In 
Panama, there was no incumbent wireless service provider, while Bulgaria had a duopoly.   
Despite their income levels, Guatemala and El Salvador feature relatively competitive wireless 
telephone markets, as measured by the HHI.  This suggests that the effect of property rights on 
license values may be understated in that market concentration, in large part a product of liberal 
policies, is included as an independent variable (HHI).  The coefficient on this variable is, as 
noted, large, positive, and statistically significant.   
    These results do not imply that all property rights awards in wireless markets lead 
to net value reductions for incumbent licensees.  The empirical analysis measures value 
differences between distinct spectrum regimes; it does not attempt to track valuation changes 
flowing from incremental policy adjustments.  A valuable policy implication is contained in the 
result that windfalls fall with sufficient liberalization.  As a general matter, extending property 
rights (or relaxing regulatory restrictions) produces not only the salubrious effect of enhancing 
consumer welfare by permitting productive use of idle spectrum resources, but can eliminate 
license rent awards for incumbents, presenting both an equity issue and a potential political 
problem.  In fact, the more interesting implication is that actions to block liberalization generate 
                                                 
71 The Nasdaq Composite Index fell to a value of 1,253.22 on March 12, 2003.  See YAHOO!FINANCE,  
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EIXIC&a=01&b=11&c=2003&d=02&e=31&f=2003&g=d.  
72 Concurring analysis is provided in Leite (2004), which finds that Australian 3G spectrum licenses generated 
considerably lower bids than 3G licenses sold elsewhere.  “To put the Australian auction in perspective, the price 
paid by Telstra, for example, represented less than 10 per cent of that paid by comparable carriers in the United 
Kingdom and Germany and 25 per cent of the amounts paid in Italy and the Netherlands for 3G spectrum last year 
[footnote omitted] (Leite 2004, 56).” 
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windfalls for incumbents.   By preventing the increase in competitive forces which investors 
anticipate under liberal license rights, existing licensees are protected from wealth losses.  These 
gains increase returns only by preventing losses; they are therefore on a margin that is invisible 
to the body politick and likely of little concern to policy makers. 
 
Alternative Explanations. 
  The conclusion that lower license rents in liberal regimes reflect expectations of lower 
retail prices is not the only possible explanation of the observed relationship between property 
rights and license values.  At least two alternative explanations are possible.  First, the estimated 
relations may be caused by large inefficiencies in operating markets.  That is, property rights 
regimes may impose substantial transaction costs or other burdens by failing to provide the 
benefits associated with government spectrum allocation.  In such a situation, the right to operate 
a wireless telephone service may be significantly less valuable than elsewhere not due to more 
competitive pricing but due to lower social gains in aggregate.  Second, while operating markets 
may be comparably efficient to those found in other regimes, licenses auctions are structured 
such that rent extraction is considerably less effective.  For a dollar of expected producers’ 
surplus that is, liberal regimes typically succeed in transferring much less to the government.  An 
example would be the use of sealed-bid, second price auctions in New Zealand in 1990, which 
resulted in prices paid for some licenses that were a small fraction of the reservation prices 
expressed by winning bidders (McMillan 1994, Crandall 1998).
73    
  These alternative explanations are important to consider.  In fact, I have elsewhere argued 
that economic research should focus on social welfare differences observed across rival spectrum 
regimes, a marked departure from current analysis wherein license auction revenues are the 
narrow focus, and country policies are ranked according to how much revenue is raised (Hazlett 
& Munoz 2004).  License auctions do offer plausible efficiencies, including social savings 
generated when the revenue raised displaces revenues collected via distortionary taxation.  Yet, 
spectrum allocation policies influence social welfare much beyond one input market (i.e., the 
market for licenses).  Performance metrics in output markets – how prices and quantities respond 
to alternative spectrum regimes – must be assessed to evaluate alternative regulatory schemes. 
                                                 
73 New Zealand’s 1990 auction results are not included in our sample, and auction rules were changed in the later 
wireless telephony license auctions.   30
  To jointly test the possibility that the alternative explanations better fit the evidence, I 
estimate the effect of liberal policies on price and output in the retail market.   The null 
hypothesis is stated thusly: 
 
  Ho:   Lower license receipts in Liberal Regimes are attributable to the expectation of 
lower retail prices due to enhanced market competitiveness.     
 
 H 1:    Lower license receipts in Liberal Regimes are attributable to inefficiencies in 
operating markets or auction bidding schemes. 
 
  This test differentiates the rival theories in broad terms, combining the inefficiency 
explanations.  If prices are lower, and outputs higher, in markets where licensed operators are 
granted extensive property rights, ceteris paribus, then the null hypothesis appears to gain 
empirical support.  Such evidence contradicts the view that the award of extensive property 
rights tends to create inefficiencies in output markets.  The view that inefficient auction methods 
in liberal regimes are the cause of the lower license auction receipts implies that operating 
market performance is unaffected by the award of extensive property rights.  Hence, 
performance gains should not be observed in liberal markets. 
  Unfortunately, retail price and output data for wireless telephone markets are not publicly 
available for all countries in our sample.  However, quarterly data for wireless telephone markets 
in thirty-one countries is published (Merrill Lynch 2003).  Included in the sample are 21 
countries that auction licenses (and are included in our 27 country sample).  Of our liberal 
regime dummy sample, which includes four countries, just two are included in these data (New 
Zealand and Australia).  The data include price (mean revenue per minute of voice usage), 
penetration (subscribers as a fraction of total population), and total minutes of use.  The data are 
quarterly, 1997-I through 2003-II (26 quarters of data).   
  In a random effects log-log model, prices and outputs for wireless service are estimated 
on the pooled cross-country time series.  In place of a supply curve, a “mark-up” equation is 
estimated, assuming a Cournot equilibrium, simultaneously with a demand function. An 
instrument was employed for output, which was defined as total minutes of use.   31
    The instrumental variable, with output (defined two different ways in alternate 
specifications) as the dependent variable, is defined as a function of the Liberal dummy (=1 if 
New Zealand or Australia), Spectrum (MHz allocated the wireless telephone market), Spectrum 
squared,
 74  HHI (market concentration measured by Herfindahl-Hirshman Index), HHI squared, 
Density (population per square kilometer), Density squared, an Auction dummy (=1 if licenses 
awarded by auction; =0 if by beauty contest), Calling-party-pays (CPP) dummy (=1 if the calling 
party does not pay entire phone call charge), per capita income, per capita income squared, fixed 
price (mean cost of a three minute call via a fixed line telephone), fixed price squared, and a 
constant.  
  Demand, with a dependent variable equal to the mean revenue per minute for wireless 
phone calls, is defined as a function of estimated subscribers, estimated subscribers squared, 
Liberal, CPP, per capital income, per capita income squared, fixed price, fixed price squared, and 
a constant term.  The mark-up equation, with price as the dependent variable, is defined as a 
function of estimated subscribers, estimated subscribers squared, Liberal, HHI, HHI squared, 
Spectrum, Spectrum squared, Density, Density squared, Auction, CPP, and a constant term.  In a 
second specification, output is defined as total minutes of use rather than total subscribers.   
  Results for the two specifications appear in Table 5.  Most estimated parameters exhibit 
a high degree of statistical significance, and are signed either correctly or, at least, plausibly.  
One interesting result is that retail prices appear to be higher in countries using auctions to assign 
licenses.  (See more detailed discussion of this model in Hazlett & Munoz 2004.)  In general, 
higher market concentration is associated with higher prices, while additional spectrum 
allocations (more bandwidth available to operators) is associated with lower prices.  Density is 
associated with lower prices.  Calling-party-pays rules are associated with higher prices.  In the 
demand function, the coefficient on fixed service price is positive and significant, suggesting that 
wireless and wireline services are generally substitutes. 
  The key results are the estimates of the Liberal dummy coefficients.  In markets with 
spectrum property rights, prices are lower and outputs are substantially higher, as implied by the 
estimated instrument.  Estimated coefficients are statistically significant at any standard 
confidence level.  These results suggest that markets with expanded property rights already 
                                                 
74  The logged term is squared (as opposed to a log taken of the squared term).  This is followed for all squared 
terms.   32
experience lower prices, supporting the view that investors bidding for licenses rationally 
anticipate that future prices will be lower.  They are inconsistent with inefficiency explanations 
for the observed differential in license revenues.   
  One shortcoming of these results is that they are estimated on a database that includes 
just two of the four Liberal countries, New Zealand and Australia.  An alternative test using a 
dataset for wireless telephone markets in 17 Latin American countries supplied by Pyramid 
Research (2003), finds prices for wireless phone service lower in Guatemala and El Salvador 
than prices elsewhere, adjusting for other market differences (Hazlett & Ibarguen 2004).
75    
These results obtained only for the pre-paid market, however; results in the post-paid market 
were not statistically significant for the Liberal dummy.  In the sample, pre-paid services 
constitute about two-thirds of wireless subscriptions, although post-paid usage is much higher 
per subscriber.  Post-paid subscribers are more likely to be business users or affluent retail 
customers, while pre-paid services cater to the mass consumer market.   Separate tests of the 
competitiveness of wireless phone markets in the two liberal Central American markets support 
the conclusion that market rivalry is more intense with spectrum property rights. 
  While further research revealing how spectrum policies influence output markets 
would surely be beneficial, the evidence now available suggests that liberalization increases 
efficiency.  This supports the conclusion that more generous property rights bundles tends to 




Radio spectrum has long served as a textbook illustration of resource misallocation.  In 
some countries, however, central planning mechanisms are gradually giving way to less 
restrictive regimes that allow market forces greater scope in determining airwave use.  In this 
transition, two fundamental questions are raised:  What evidence is there that social welfare is 
increased by liberalizing property rights?  How should the windfalls associated with expanded 
productive opportunities be distributed?   
                                                 
75 Reduced form price equations were estimated on panel data, 1997-2002, using random effects and a log-log 
specification.  The dependent variable, in two separate equations, was the natural log of the mean revenue per 
minute of mobile phone use, first for pre-paid service, then for post-paid service.  Right-hand side terms were: a   33
  Wireless phone license auctions yield important evidence that can be used to answer 
these questions.  Analysis of a unique data set encompassing the sale of 1,438 licenses in 42 
auctions conducted in 27 countries demonstrates that, after adjusting for demand and cost 
differences, countries awarding much more expansive property rights see winning bids about 
38% below prices paid for similar licenses elsewhere.   Investors in wireless telecommunications 
systems anticipate that the loss in exclusivity associated with a more liberal regulatory regime 
outweighs the gain in productivity insofar as the network operator’s profits are concerned.   
Alternative explanations focusing on anticipated inefficiencies of property rights regimes are 
rejected by additional evidence showing that competitiveness in wireless telephone markets is 
generally more intense, and prices lower, in countries adopting spectrum liberalization. 
  This finding is consistent with theoretical work on deregulation by economists who stress 
that privatization per se is less important that the introduction of market competition (see, e.g., 
Vickers and Yarrow 1988), and with recent empirical work on telecommunications privatization 
which finds that monopoly rights inspire a substantial premium in sales of state phone companies 
(Wallsten 2003).  And it supports telecommunications economists who have conjectured that the 
gains from permitting more productive use of radio spectrum create widespread social gains: 
 
Additional flexibility is not guaranteed to cause huge windfalls, even if on the 
surface it would appear to do so.  The primary impact would be to give the 
opportunity for incumbent licenses to provide more services to consumers, 
leading to increased consumer welfare.  But for each licensee liberated to provide 
additional or more valuable services, there would be other licensees similarly 
freed to compete.  Some licensees might even end up worse off on balance as a 
result of the increased competition.  It would therefore be a serious mistake for 
policy makers to become preoccupied with the need to extract assumed windfall 
gains from licensees (Owen & Rosston 2001, 9). 
 
  The evidence on license values and property rights could prove helpful in at least three 
analytical discussions concerning spectrum policy.  First, the social gains from liberalization are 
                                                                                                                                                             
constant, subscribers, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity, HHI, density, fixed lines, and a Liberal dummy 
(=1 if Guatemala or El Salvador, 0 elsewise).   34
potentially quite large.  Reduced bids for licenses conveying property rights suggest lower retail 
prices are anticipated.  Not only will the reduced profits transfer to consumer surplus, social 
gains are likely to be far higher due to efficiency gains emanating from more productive use of 
airwaves.  These include social gains from higher output in communications markets, a greater 
diversity of applications (supported by the larger capacity of networks), and an increased flow of 
technological innovation (due to reduced barriers to entry in obtaining a key input).
76  Property 
rights promote a “cheap spectrum” policy.
77 
  Second, the negative relationship between property rights and license prices helps explain 
why incumbent licensees have often been in the forefront of regulatory efforts to impose “public 
interest” regulation.  This legal structure severely truncates property rights, restricting both 
competitive opportunities and competitive threats.   Regulatory reform, either captured, deterred 
or altered by incumbents, is consequently difficult to implement despite the consensus among 
economists that expansive, flexible rights create social benefits (Coase 1959, Rosston et al. 
2001).   
  Finally, the evidence provides an important contribution to the normative debate 
involving the windfalls associated with spectrum property rights. If sufficiently broad, 
liberalization is not associated with “unjust enrichment,” but rather with a decline in the value of 
incumbency.  Spectrum allocation systems that restrict flexibility of operators effectively award 
windfalls to incumbent licensees via reduced competitive entry.  The equity argument against 
expansive spectrum property rights reverses.  In that expanded property rights are associated 
with reduced license rents, political actions blocking substantial liberalization implicitly bestow 
windfall gains on industry incumbents.    
                                                 
76 Consumer gains from increased wireless productivity are thought to be at least an order of magnitude larger than 
the value of licenses.  Greg Rosston estimated that if cellular telephone licenses had been auctioned in the 1980s, 
approximately $30 billion in revenue would likely have been raised (Rosston 1994).  At the same time, Jerry 
Hausman (1997) estimates that annual consumer surplus associated with cellular was in the neighborhood of $30 to 
$50 billion.  Assuming, very conservatively, a social discount rate of 10% suggests that the present value of 
consumers savings exceeded ten times the value of licenses.  See also Rosston (2001, p. 24). 
77 This evidence directly figures in the debate over licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum allocation (Benjamin 2003), as 
it shows the social benefits possible from allowing markets to make more efficient use of licensed spectrum.    35
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TABLE 1.  SPECTRUM REGIMES: STANDARD AND LIBERAL 
 







Spectrum allocation  Explicit 
property 
right? 
Standard Defined  Defined Defined  Regulatory  No 
Guatemala Undefined  Undefined  Undefined  By  request  Yes 
El Salvador  Undefined  Defined but 
unconstrained
Undefined By  request  No 
New Zealand  Undefined  Undefined  Undefined Regulator  identifies 
bands to assign to 
spectrum managers 
Yes 
Australia Undefined  Undefined  Undefined Regulator  identifies 
and allocates blocks of 







TABLE 2.  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY VARIABLES 
 
Variable N  Mean  Standard 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Winning bid (million U.S. $)  1438  91.446  702.30  0.00102  9974.5 
HHI (thousand)  1438  2.748  0.622  1.058  6.216 
Income (thousand U.S. $)  1389  26.310  7.847  0.297  52.351 
Bandwidth (MHz)  1438  12.584  7.810  2.000  65.000 
K (million subscribers)  1438  0.0317  0.122  0.0002  1.238 
NASDAQ (thousand)  1438  1.659  0.792  0.817  4.573 
Fixed line connection charge 
(U.S. $) 
1398 63.487  47.519  0.000  467.19 
Price of fixed tel. 3-min local 
call (U.S. $) 
1398 0.107  0.026  0.000  0.194 
License term (years)  1438  11.439  3.056  5.000  20.000 
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TABLE 3.  DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description  Form  Expected 
coefficient 
sign  
Pijt  Price of wireless telephone license i, auctioned by country 
j, at time t (date auction closed) (Dec. 2002 $US millions). 
ln Dependent 
variable 
HHIi  A proxy for expected Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in area 
served by license i, at t+3 (years).  Constructed by linear 
extrapolation of HHI trend at t. 
ln + 
GNPPCi  Income per capita in area served by license i (Dec. 2002 
$) 
ln + 
WIDTHi  Bandwidth allocated to license i (MHz)   ln  + 
POPit  Population in license i coverage area   ln  +/-? 
NASDAQt  Closing monthly level of NASDAQ stock market 
following time t  
ln + 
3Gi  Dummy variable =1 if 3G or IMT-2000, 0 otherwise.    0,1  + 
MHzi  Dummy for frequency band: =1 if license i assigned 
frequencies in 800 or 900 MHz bands; 0 otherwise. 
0,1 + 
LIBj  Dummy for liberal spectrum rights: =1 for Australia, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and New Zealand; zero 
otherwise. 
0,1 +/-? 
TERMi  Length of license term (years)  ln  +/0? 
AUCTi  Dummy variable for auction type: first price sealed bid 
auction = 1; zero otherwise. 
0,1 +/-? 
INCUMjt  Dummy variable for incumbency: =1 if license winner 
operated a wireless network in the market; zero otherwise. 
0,1 + 
URBjt  Country’s degree of urbanization (%) in year of auction  ln  + 
DENSEij  License area’s number of inhabitants per square kilometer 
in year of auction 
ln + 
FCALLjt  Mean price of a 3-minute residential local call (peak) in 
the period [t-1, t+1] (Dec. 2002 $) 
ln +/-? 
FCONNjt  Mean value of residential fixed line connection charge [t-
1, t+1] (Dec. 2002 $) 
ln +/-? 
LEGALj  Discrete variable defining “economic freedom” 
(1,2,…10), with higher values indicating more secure 
property rights.   
1,…,10 + 
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Coefficient  ∆ Indep. 
variable 










































































































































No.Observations 1309  1309     
R-Square 0.8396  0.8395     
Values of t-statistics in parenthesis. *=99% confidence, **=95% confidence. White heteroskedasticity consistent 
standard errors.  Dependent variable is natural logarithm of the amount paid by winning bidder (in Dec. 2002 US 
million dollars).  
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TABLE 5.  Price and Output in Wireless Markets.  Log-log Specification.  Dependent Variable 
= ln(mean revenue per minute of use).  Instrument: Estimated total minutes of use. All 
estimations use a random effects model (GLS). 
 















































































































No.Observations 383  383  402 
R-Square Within  0.3817  0.6774  0.6508 
R-Square Between   0.2483  0.0556  0.2620 
R-Square Overall  0.2928  0.1352  0.3151 
Values of z-statistics in parenthesis. *=99% confidence, **=95% confidence, ***=90% confidence. Two Stage IV 
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FIGURE 2.  MEAN PRICE OF CELLULAR LICENSE PER AUCTION  
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APPENDIX 1. WIRELESS TELEPHONY LICENSE AUCTIONS SUMMARY: 1995-2001 
 









Argentina Jun-99 0.320 40.0 SMR  Cellular  6  1.8  GHz 
Australia  Sep-98  0.179  6.4  MR  Cellular  18  800 MHz/1.8 GHz 
Australia May-99  0.011 10.0  MR Cellular 1  800  MHz 
Australia Mar-00  1.242  5.0  SMR  Cellular  60  1.8  GHz 
Australia Mar-01  0.303  9.7  SMR  3G  46 1.9-2.1  GHz 
Austria May-99  0.480  29.2 n.a.  Cellular  1  1.8  GHz 
Austria May-00  0.208  13.2  SMR  Cellular  3  1.8  GHz 
Austria Nov-00  0.628  16.1  SMR  3G  9 1.9-2.1  GHz 
Belgium Mar-01  0.385 35.4 SMR  3G  3  1.9-2.1  GHz 
Bolivia Nov-99  0.068  30.0  FP Cellular  1  1.8  GHz 
Brazil Apr-97  2.254  25.0 FP  Cellular  10 800  MHz 
Brazil Feb-01  0.270  30.0 FP  Cellular  3  1.8  GHz 
Brazil Mar-01  0.177  30.0 FP  Cellular  1  1.8  GHz 
Bulgaria  Dec-00  1.301  14.0  MR  Cellular  1  800 MHz/1.8 GHz 
Canada Feb-01  0.789  14.9  SMR  Cellular  35  1.8  GHz 
Czech Rep.  Dec-01  0.176  55.0  FP  Cellular/3G  2  1.8 GHz/1.9-2.1 GHz 
Denmark Sep-01  0.632 35.0 FPL  3G  4  1.9-2.1  GHz 
El Salvador  Jul-98  0.029  7.9  SMR  Cellular  1 
a 800  MHz 
El Salvador  Feb-01  0.082  50.0  FP  Cellular  1  1.8 GHz 
Germany Oct-99  0.144 2.1  SMR  Cellular  10  1.8  GHz 
Germany Aug-00  4.066 24.2 SMR  3G  6  1.9-2.1  GHz 
Greece  Jul-01 0.402 35.0  FP  3G  3  1.9-2.1  GHz 
Greece  Jul-01 0.201 23.3  FP  Cellular  3  800  MHz/1.8  GHz 
Guatemala Aug-98 0.076  6.7  FP  Cellular 3  800  MHz 
Guatemala Mar-99 0.104  20.0  FP  Cellular 2  1.8  GHz 
Guatemala Oct-99 0.054  20.0  FP  Cellular 3  1.8  GHz 
Hungary Jun-99  0.264  40.0 n.a. Cellular  3  1.8  GHz 
Italy Oct-00  1.553  24.0  SMR  3G  5  1.9-2.1  GHz 
Jamaica Dec-99  0.623  30.0  FP Cellular  1  800  MHz   47
Jamaica Jan-00  0.644  30.0 FP  Cellular  1  800  MHz 
Mexico May-98  0.124  19.4 SMR  Cellular  34  1.8  GHz 
Morocco  Jul-99 2.041 20.0  FP 
b Cellular 1  800  MHz 
Netherlands Feb-98  0.388  9.1  SMR Cellular 18  1.8  GHz 
Netherlands  Jul-00 1.145 28.8 SMR  3G  5  1.9-2.1  GHz 
New Zealand  Jan-01  0.036  11.0  SMR  Cellular/3G  40 
c 1.7-2.3  GHz 
Nigeria  Jan-01  0.067  40.0  SMR2  Cellular  3  800 MHz/1.8 GHz 
Panama Jan-96  1.284  24.8 FP  Cellular  1  800  MHz 
Peru Mar-00  0.247  30.0  FP  Cellular  1  1.8  GHz 
Switzerland Dec-00  0.124  35.0  SMR  3G  4  1.9-2.1  GHz 
UK Apr-00  4.551  28.0  SMR  3G  5  1.9-2.1  GHz 
USA (A&B)  Mar-95  0.619  30.0  SMR  Cellular  99  1.8 GHz 
USA (D&E)  Jan-97  0.424  10.0  SMR  Cellular  981  1.8 GHz 
TOTAL 
LICENSES 
         
1438 
 
Notes:  The date refers to the month in which the auction ended.  Prices are Dec. 2002 values deflated using the U.S. monthly CPI.  Bandwidth is average 
bandwidth of all licenses sold in the auction.   Cellular service refers to any digital cellular telephony service different from 3G.  The No. of licenses refers to 
license sold. The Frequency band is used to identify (loosely) the frequency ranges used. For example the 800 MHz band generally includes frequencies in the 
range 800-950 MHz.  The 1.8 GHz band usually includes frequencies in the range 1700-1950 MHz; and the 1.9-2.1 GHz generally includes frequencies in the 
range 1900-2170 MHz.  Countries have small differences between the frequencies used in each band. 
Auction types: MR = Multiple round (sequential); SMR = Simultaneous multiple round auction; SMR2 = simultaneous multiple round 2
nd price auction;  
FP = First price sealed-bid; FPL= Lowest price of the four winning bids. Winner of each license determined by first price sealed bid offers. 
a Six regional licenses were auctioned but only one bidder applied. A full price of 11 million Colones was paid for the bundle of six auctions which on aggregate 
cover the whole country.  
b Strictly speaking the Moroccan auction was a beauty contest which assigned a weight of 60% to the bid offered in a sealed envelope.  It happens that the highest 
bid offer won the license; thus, we include it as a first price sealed bid auction.  
c Management rights. 
n.a.= Not available.   48




Data on auction winners, winning bids, auction type, spectrum allocation and industry structure 
are taken primarily from the following sources: each country’s telecommunications regulator and 
Communications Ministry; Pyramid Research; The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire 
database; the European Commission and the European Radio Communications Office. Country 
wide data such as population, income and urbanization are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.  Whenever the country is divided into multiple license areas (Australia, 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Mexico and the U.S.), socioeconomic and demographic data specific 
to each license area were obtained from the auction information packages and each country’s 
Census Bureau.
78 Country data on fixed telephony prices and fixed and mobile telephone 
penetration rate are from the International Telecommunications Union’s World 
Telecommunications Indicators 2002 database. Finally, the incumbent dummy by license area in 
these six countries was constructed from the historic information for license assignments and 
reviews of the market structure for specific years. The main sources were each country’s 
telecommunications regulator and Communications Ministry. 
 
A brief description of the main sources by country follows. 
  
1) Australia 
Australian Communications Authority, “Auction results”; 
http://auction.aca.gov.au/auction_results/index.asp 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
CIT Publications, Datafile of Asia-Pacific Telecommunications, Australia (June 2002); 
Http://www.cit-online.com/dat/dat/aus_c1.htm 




Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs, “Frequency allocation: Previous Auctions”;  
http://www.rtr.at/web.nsf/englisch/Telekommunikation~Frequenzvergabe~Bisherige+Auktionen 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
CIT Publications, Datafile of European Telecommunications, Austria Mobile 
Telecommunications (May 2002); http://www.cit-online.com/det/det/aut_c.htm 
European Union, Basic Facts & Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 
 
                                                 
78 Each country information package typically lists population for each license area but does not include income per 
capita. For the six countries noted, per capita income in each license area was obtained for each country’s Bureau of 
Census except for the U.S. where Rand McNally’s “Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide 2001” 132
nd Edition was 
the source. For consistency between these six countries and the rest of the sample, we first estimated the ratio of per 
capita income in the license area to national income, and then multiplied this ratio times the World Bank estimates 
of gross per capita national income.    49
3) Argentina 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire,  Argentina: Business: New Analysis, "PCS auctions 
finally complete" (Jul. 16, 1999); CIT Publications, "Datafile of Latin America 
Telecommunications: Argentina". (August 1999); 
http://www.lynxtech.com/citpubs/dlat/Arg_a1.htm  
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
4) Belgium 
Belgian Institute of Postal Service and Telecommunications, “IMT 2000/UMTS";  
http://www.umts.bipt.be/EN/m43.htm 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Fact&Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 
ABN-AMRO NM Rothschild & Sons, "Belgian Spectrum Auctions of Third Generation Mobile 
Communications," (Sep. 2000);  http://www.umts.ibpt.be/EN/22/ 
 
5) Bolivia 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire; 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica. http://www.ine.gov.bo 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
6) Brazil 
ANATEL.  http://www.anatel.gov.br 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica;  http://www.ibge.net 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire  
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
7) Bulgaria 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 




Industry Canada, “Spectrum Auctions” http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/sf01714e.html 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association, "Wireless Facts and Figures"; 
http//www.cwta.ca/industry_guide/facts.php3   50
 
9) Czech Republic 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire  
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Radio Communications Office, "ERO Information Document on GSM Frequency 
Utilisation within Europe" (Feb. 10, 2001); http://www.ero.dk 
 
10) Denmark 
National Telecom Agency. IT and Telecom Professionals. Frequencies.  
http://www.itst.dk/wimpdoc.asp?page=tema&objno=95024034 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
National Telecom Agency; http://www.itst.dk 
 
11) El Salvador 
SIGET; http://www.siget.gob.sv/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
12) Germany 
Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Posts. 
http://www.regtp.de/en/index.html 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Fact&Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 




National Telecommuincations and Post Commission. UMTS/DCS-GSM.  
http://www.eet.gr/eng_pages/telec/umts/Main.htm 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Facts & Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 
 
14) Guatemala 
SIT, Subastas; http://www.sit.gob.gt/subastas.htm 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire  
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
15) Hungary 
Economist Intelligence Unit,Viewswire    51
Communications Authority of Hungary; http://www.hif.hu/english/index1.html 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Communications Authority of Hungary; http://www.hif.hu/english/index1.html 
 
16) Italy 
Ministero delle Comunicación; http://www.comunicazioni.it/it/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Facts & Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 
 
17) Jamaica 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire   
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 








Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America. 
 
19) Morocco 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire 
Agence Nationale de Reglementation des Telecommunications;  http://www.anrt.net.ma/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
ITU, World Telecommunications Indicators 2002 
 
20) The Netherlands 
Minister of Transport Public Works and Water Management; http://www.minvenw.nl 
Telecommunications and Post Department;  http://www.dgtp.nl 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Facts & Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 
 
21) Nigeria 
Nigerian Communications Commission, Digital Mobile Licensing; 
http://ncc.gov.ng/digital_mobile/digital_mobile_index.htm 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index:   52
Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire 
Africa Online; http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,3,44412.jsp 
 
22) New Zealand 
Ministry of Economic Development, Radio Spectrum Auction Information;  
http://auction.med.govt.nz/; Statistics New Zealand; http://www.stats.govt.nz/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Ministry of Economic Development;  http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/tip8/index.html 
 
23) Panama 
Ministry of Government and Justice; 
http://www.enteregulador.gob.pa/telecom/Contratos/bsc30.asp 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
24) Peru 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, Unidad Especial de Concesiones de 
Telecomunicaciones,  "Distibucion de la banda comperendida de 1850 a 1990 MHz";  
http://www.mtc.gob.pe/comunicaciones/uect/Banda_PCS.htm 
OSIPTEL, "Memoria Annual, April 1999- March 2000”;  http://www.osiptel.gov.pe/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Pyramid Research, Pyramid Mobile Forecast Latin America 
 
25) Switzerland 
Federal Office of Communications, "UMTS Factsheet"; 
http://www.bakom.ch/en/telekommunikation/forschung/umts/index.html 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
Federal Communications Commission, Annual Report 2000 and 2001;  
http://www.fedcomcom.ch/comcom/e/rapports/rapports_home.html 
 
26) United Kingdom 
Radio Communications Agency; http://www.spectrumauctions.gov.uk/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 
European Union, Basic Facts & Indicators:  http://www.eu-esis.org/Basic/HomeBasic.htm 




Federal Communications Commission;  http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ 
 
Subscriber data for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index:   53
Federal Communications Commission, Report and Order, In the Matter of Amendment of Parts 
20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules - Broadband PCS competitive bidding and the Commercial 
Mobile Radio Service Spectrum Cap,  WT Docket No. 96-59, and Amendment of the 
Commission's Cellular/PCS Cross-Ownership Rule, GN Docket No. 90-314 (FCC 96-278 (June 
24, 1996).  Sprint PCS Ex Parte Notification, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 1998 Biennial 
Regulatory Review - Spectrum Aggregation Limits for Wireless Telecommunications Carriers, 
WT Docket No. 98-205. (August 13, 1999) 
 